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The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) is
being implemented in 100,000 odd villages across the
country1 as a safety net for the poor. It is being widely
tracked and studied as an example of the ‘employer of last
resort’ (ELR) programme in a developing economy (Wray,
2007). The Act states that its main objective is ‘to provide* Tel: þ91 80 26993748; fax: þ91 80 26584050.
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1 With all the 604 districts under NREGA from April 2008, the
government is expected to spend around Rs 20,000 crores (200
billion) annually on the implementation of the NREGA during 2008e
2009.for the enhancement of livelihood security of the house-
holds in rural areas of the country by providing at least one
hundred days of guaranteed wage employment in every
financial year to every household whose adult members
volunteer to do unskilled manual work.’ (Government of
India, 2005). The idea behind the government providing an
effective safety net for the poor by giving an employment
guaranteedELRdis to ensure that any person who is able
and willing to work, but who otherwise cannot find work
will be provided public employment at a basic wage. The
concept of the government being the employer of last
resort has been in the economic literature since the
seventeenth century, and is quoted every time it is felt that
market economies lack an inherent mechanism to create
full employment2. According to a recent International
Labour Organisation (ILO) report (2007), the number of
unemployed is up almost 35 million over the last decade.
Among several public and private initiatives to promote
employment, an ELR programme is one programme that is
seen to provide employment at a basic wage rate to those
who cannot find work. ELR is seen to be different from
Keynesian pump-priming as its thrust is not limited to
increasing Aggregate Demand during recessionary/defla-
tionary times. It is also different from welfare programmes
like Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) in the sense that it
requires beneficiaries to work for their compensation. In
that sense, ELR is not an emergency policy, or a substitute
for private sector employment, but in the context of
a developing economy, it has to be a complement to private
sector employment.
The NREGA is seen as the world’s largest public enti-
tlement programme that for the first time is giving rural
households a right to employment, going beyond a mere2 See Kaboub (2007) for a survey on the theories and policy
experiences of employment guarantee programmes.
National rural employment guarantee act 43welfare or poverty alleviation programme. However, to
assess the NREGA and its design as an effective safety net,
we have to analyse it within the context of the employment
and unemployment trends in rural India today. The trends
and characteristics of the rural labour force in India are
markedly different from that of the developed economies.
The NREGA has been in operation now in 330 districts of
India (200 most backward districts in 2006, and 130 more
districts in 2007). There have also been several assessment
studies tracking its impact in the two initial years in certain
districts of the country3. A lot of the impact assessment
veers around implementation issues of the Act. As has been
pointed out by these studies and the Round Table Discussion
on the NREGA that follows, it is the details of imple-
mentation that need attention. With the Act set to cover
the whole of rural India, there is now an urgency that it
deliver to the people what it promises. Understanding the
implementation of the NREGA within wider employment
and unemployment trends in rural India will also bring these
implementation issues sharply into focus.
This note therefore sets out to take stock of the unem-
ployment trends in rural India and analyse the design and
implementation of the NREGA, given the broader trends in
the rural labour force which are being seen today.
Trends in rural unemployment in India and the
implementation of the NREGA
The concept of employment guarantee in India is different
from that in the developed countries. In developed coun-
tries, the unemployment is largely open/frictional/struc-
tural, and employment guarantee involves guaranteeing
a specified minimum income to the unemployed. The
nature of unemployment is more complex and intractable
in India. Official unemployment rates in India tend to be
low (around 2%) since unemployment is a luxury which the
poor in India can rarely afford (Papola, 1992, 2004, 2005).
The poor in India engage themselves in any activity, irre-
spective of its earning potential, so long as it makes some
contribution to the household income. The poor are poor
not because they are unemployed but because they are
irregularly employed as ‘casual wage labourers’4 at very
low and uncertain wages, or derive sporadic, volatile, and
uncertain incomes from self-employment, mostly in the
unorganised and informal sectors. This employment at very
low levels of productivity and income, sometimes lower
than what is considered to be necessary for basic suste-
nance is a bigger problem than that of unemployment. An
employment guarantee programme for rural India has to
incorporate this reality.
The National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) has
been conducting quinquennial surveys on employment and3 The Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) also
brought out a report on the implementation of the NREGA. (CAG,
2007). The CAG audit covered 513 gram panchayats in 128 blocks in
68 districts.
4 The National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) defines
a casual wage labourer as a person who was casually engaged in
others’ farm or non-farm enterprises, and in return received wages
according to the terms of the daily or periodic work contract.unemployment, based on which estimates of employment
and unemployment can be derived on three different
basesdthe Usual Status (US), Current Weekly Status
(CWS), and Current Daily Status (CDS)5. The rates of
unemployment according to the three concepts will have
different implications for employment policy. The CDS
rate is the most inclusive, covering open as well as
disguised unemployment. The difference between the
unemployment rates as per the CDS and the US gives the
true picture of unemployment, including underemploy-
ment. Ideally, a safety net like the NREGA should tackle
chronic unemployment as measured by the US combined
with the distribution of the underemployed by degree of
underemploymentdfull time or intermittent. However,
a welfare programme designed to cover all the unem-
ployed and the underemployed would be of faulty design,
since the underemployed will be able to take up only
seasonal and part-time work. This often lies at the root of
the ‘demand’ problem plaguing the implementation of the
NREGA, which has been brought out in the Round Table
Discussion on the NREGA that follows. Though the NREGA
is a ‘demand-driven’ programme, implementation road-
blocks in taking in work applications, giving ‘timely’ work,
and most importantly, making full and timely payment of
wages implies that the NREGA will be compared by the
potential workers to other work in the unorganised sector,
which may not necessarily be better paying, but is timely
and is offered regularly with assured wages in lean-times
when the worker can do only seasonal work. Unemploy-
ment in India is very diverse and differs widely according
to region, age, gender, occupational categories, educa-
tional categories and social groups. All this will have
a bearing on the design and implementation of an ELR
programme. In India, given the peculiar nature of the
unemployment problem, an ELR programme like the
NREGA has to aim at raising and smoothening the volatile
income streams of participants, with the express intent of
reducing the severity of poverty and distress associated
with casual, informal and migratory employment. To that
extent, it goes beyond providing a job guarantee at a basic
wage rate to the unemployed.
We present the employment-unemployment trends seen
in rural India, as per the latest 62nd round of the NSSO
(Government of India, 2006) for the period July 2005eJune
2006 in Exhibit 1. The NREGA was introduced in February
2006; thus these results will shed some light on how the Act
was designed and implemented to tackle the issue of
employment guarantee in rural India, whether it has been
able to achieve its purpose and what further improvements
can be suggested by analysing the unemployment data.
Overall unemployment rates in the rural areas were not
high (about 2%) and the figures were much lower for
females. The high degree of seasonal and intra-seasonal
unemployment is also indicated by the unemployed person-5 The Usual Status (US) concept has a reference period of one
year; on the Current Weekly Status (CWS) criterion a person is
considered unemployed if s/he has not worked even for one hour
during the week, though s/he was available for work; the Current
Daily Status (CDS) measures all the days of the unemployed and the
underemployed during the reference week.
Exhibit 1 Unemployment rate for rural India (July 2005eJune 2006).
Status Male
(% of labour force)
Female
(% of labour force)
Persons
(% of labour force)
US 2.0 1.2 1.7
CWS 4.3 3.3 4.0
CDS 8.3 7.5 8.1
US: Usual Status; CWS: Current Weekly Status; CDS: Current Daily Status.
Source: NSSO Round 62.
44 R. Kamathday rates (indicated by the CDS approach) being much
higher than the US or the WS approach.
There are also substantial gender differentials in the
Worker Participation Rate (WPR) for different levels of
education in rural areas. Exhibit 2 shows the education
level specific Usual Status Worker Participation Rate for the
age group 15e29 years.
In the age group, 15e29 years WPR was highest among
the illiterate for both male and female workers indicating
the unskilled nature of works in which they were
employed. There are also substantial gender differentials
in the WPR for different levels of education. It is inter-
esting to note that the WPR for males with middle school
education and graduation is similar (around 68 to 69%),
while the WPR for females with just middle school
education (around 31%) is higher than for those with
a graduate education (around 26%). So we are looking at
a labour force in the rural areas (both male and female)
which is predominantly unskilled and illiterate.
The degree of rural unemployment also varies as per
occupation. The broad groups of employed surveyed by the
NSSO are (1) self-employed (persons operating their own
farm or non-farm enterprises), (2) regular wage/salaried
employees (persons who worked in others’ farm or non-
farm enterprises and in return, received a salary or wages
on a regular basis, and (3) casual wage labour (person who
was casually engaged in others’ farm or non-farm enter-
prises and in turn received wages according to the terms of
daily or periodic work contract). During 2005e2006, in rural
India, more than half of the workers were self-
employedd57% among males and 62% among females
(Exhibit 3). The proportion of casual labour was higherExhibit 2 Education level specific Usual Status Worker
Participation Rate in rural India.
Education Level Male Female
Illiterate 90.5 49.3
Literate and up to middle school 84.4 38.6
Middle school 67.8 31.2
Secondary school 53.6 21.0






Secondary and above 54.8 21.2
For age group 15e29 years, July 2005eJune 2006.among females as compared to males, and much of the self-
employment was in agriculture.
The data reflects another trend in the Indian rural labour
scenariodthe increasing casualisation of the rural labour
force. There is an increase in male casual labour from 31%
in 1987e1988 to 33% in 2005e2006. This trend in the rural
labour force data has to be read in conjunction with the
increase in the reverse-tenancy in the rural areas, where
small and marginal farmers are leasing their lands back and
getting into agricultural and casual labour or migrating
(NSSO 48th Round: Government of India, 1999).Tackling rural unemployment through the NREGA:
pointers to effective implementation
The preceding data points out to the kind of demand
patterns that will emerge for an employment guarantee
programme in rural India, the key design features and the
implementation issues that will have to be incorporated
into any such public safety net scheme:
1) Employment guarantee in the rural areas has to take
into account the very large proportion of underem-
ployed (seasonally or intermittently employed); so the
nature of demand and participation in such pro-
grammes will be not be all the year round but only
during the slack agricultural season.
2) Given that this high proportion of underemployment is
related to agriculture, employment guarantee in the
rural areas cannot be divested of agriculture; the
associated seasonality of agriculture and the impact of
yearly rainfall and drought on agriculture have to be in-
built in any such scheme.
3) The existing employment data clearly indicates that
female labour participation in such programmes will be
high and the employment programme will have to take
into account their part-time participation, since the
extent of underemployment is higher among females as
compared to males.
4) Since a major proportion of the labour force in the rural
areas in the age group 15e29 is illiterate, the nature of
jobs demanded will be unskilled; any scheme calling for
rigorous form-filling or any written registration is
unlikely to be successful.
The NREGA therefore has to take into account the sea-
sonality of agriculture and the part-time availability of
workers. Not only will works have to be provided in the
slack period of agriculture, but demand projections will
Exhibit 3 Percentage of usually employed by status of employment in rural India.









62 (July 2005eJune 2006) 56.7 10.0 33.3 62.2 3.9 33.9
61 (July 2004eJune 2005) 58.1 9.0 32.9 63.7 3.7 32.6
55 (July 1999eJune 2000) 55.0 8.8 36.2 57.3 3.1 39.6
50 (July 1993eJune 1994) 57.7 8.5 33.8 58.6 2.7 38.7
43 (July 1987eJune 1988) 58.6 10.0 31.4 60.8 3.7 35.5
National rural employment guarantee act 45have to be made taking into account the rainfall and agri-
cultural performance for each year. Demand for works will
also differ from region to region, depending upon the agro-
climatic conditions. Since the NREGA has to be aligned
closely to micro factors like agricultural output and agro-
climatic conditions, its effective implementation will hinge
on local community participation in planning of works and
effective decentralisation (political, administrative and
financial). Implementation issues are likely to arise because
of poorly decentralised administration and financial devo-
lution of the NREGA in many states.
Given the extent of self-employment in the rural labour
force (Exhibit 3), both small and marginal landowners as
well as the landless would be demanding jobs under the
NREGA. This makes it necessary to align the NREGA with (1)
agricultural seasonality in general, and (2) the interests of
the small and marginal farmers especially in the dry-land
regions, along with the interests of the landless. There-
fore, linking the NREGA and asset creation related to water
in the dry land areas becomes imperative.
The experience of the Maharashtra Employment Guar-
antee Scheme (EGS), and the data above point out to the
crucial role played by female workers (Dev & Ranade, 2001)
in such a scheme. The extent of underemployment is higher
among the female workers as compared to the male
workers; therefore the NREGA has to be aligned to the
interests of the female workers. The Act requires that at
least one-third of the beneficiaries be women. But it has to
be emphasised that their participation will be part-time,
and some provision has to be made for child-care facili-
ties (already codified in the Act, but very poorly imple-
mented on the ground).
Illiteracy of the labour force implies that any procedure
asking for written applications, registration, and other
form-filling will be very difficult to implement. This has also
been documented by several assessment studies of the
NREGA (Ambasta, Vijay Shankar, & Shah, 2008).
Most importantly, this data points out to a key differ-
ence of an ELR scheme to be implemented in rural India as
compared to the developed economies. Most ELR litera-
ture talks of it as a permanent complement to private
sector employment. While the ELR in rural India has to be
complementary to agriculture and will be in demand only
during the slack seasons, the very nature of subsistence
employment in India implies that it has to also carry out
the task of ‘pulling away’ workers from low-paying,
subsistence and informal jobs, and migration. Therefore,
to that extent the NREGA has to provide a viable substituteto such informal and subsistence jobs. This difference is
sharply brought out in the debates about the kind of wages
to be fixed under the NREGA. While wage rates slightly
lower than the market rates will work in the developed
countries as a ‘self-selection’ measure to hive off the
bottom, it will not work in many rural areas of India,
where market rates are close to subsistence. Therefore,
the bound of the minimum wage rate and its rigorous
implementation under the NREGA become very important.
Not only should minimum wage rates be given, but wages
should be provided on time, and for all the days that the
worker has worked. While the NREGA may not be able to
pull people above the poverty line, it should provide
a guaranteed safety net during distress. Distress in this
case may not mean unemployment, but irregular and
migratory employment at exploitative wages. In the two
years of its working, the fact that the NREGA has made
a dent in the existing wages has been documented, as has
the convergence in the wage rates being given to men and
women (Mehrotra, 2008).
Developmental potential of the NREGA
There is a need to look at the NREGA beyond employment
generation. Most employment guarantee schemes have
traditionally underemphasised the value to the poor of the
assets created, which either appear to benefit the non-
poor, or are plagued by problems of non-completion and
poor maintenance (Ravallion, 2000, 2007). In any employ-
ment guarantee programme, there will always be an uneasy
trade-off between increasing current incomes to the poor
and creating future assets. The emphasis in the beginning
will be on current income gains, implying the labour
intensive nature of the projects undertaken. The NREGA
also mandates for a 60:40 wage-material ratio, or higher
ratio for the districts. Many experts state that this also is
the reason for the poor quality of assets created under the
NREGA. A recent report by the Centre for Science and
Environment (CSE) (2008) clearly believes that the low
demand for works under the NREGA is mostly due to the low
focus on the creation of productive village assets. If the
NREGA is also implemented as a long-term development
programme, it can increase people’s interest in the pro-
gramme. Despite the non-negotiable focus of productive
assets on water conservation, works like drought proofing,
flood control and land development are given low priority.
Their report emphasises that water conservation and
associated works must be made the mainstay for the
Exhibit 4 Statewise distribution (per thousand) of




did not get work
Did not
seek work
Andhra Pradesh 51 68 880
Assam 33 56 889
Bihar 12 99 880
Chattisgarh 146 184 670
Gujarat 27 72 901
Haryana 7 23 970
Himachal Pradesh 30 51 919
Jammu & Kashmir 8 20 971
Jharkhand 39 118 840
Karnataka 17 15 968
Kerala 3 16 981
Madhya Pradesh 94 98 804
Maharashtra 47 79 874
Orissa 59 81 858
Punjab 2 38 959
Rajasthan 138 134 729
Tamil Nadu 8 26 966
Uttarakhand 102 32 866
Uttar Pradesh 21 52 918
West Bengal 77 94 818
Exhibit 5 Variation in demand for public works.
1Z Very low demand
for public works
Haryana, Himachal










46 R. Kamathmajority of the NREGA districts which lie in the dry land
areas. The CAG (2007) report on the NREGA clearly stated
that despite the focus on the creation of productive assets
in the Act, the lack of adequately trained functionaries at
the village level meant that there was no proper selection
of projects for many districts. Therefore, asset creation
under the NREGA goes hand-in-hand with tackling gover-
nance issues at the village administration level. For the
NREGA to become a poverty alleviation programme, it must
go beyond relief to the poor during distress, by investing in
the creation of durable assets such as better land, forest,
water bodies, pasture land and rural roads, which can
initiate the growth spiral in the backward districts of the
country. In fact, creation, ownership and maintenance of
durable assets are the next big challenges in the imple-
mentation of the NREGA.
Differential regional performance of the NREGA
The state-wise distribution of the figures for person-days of
employment generated per household in the two years of
the implementation of the NREGA (2006e2007 and 2007e
2008) show considerable variation across the states. How
much of this regional difference is due to differences in
demand, and how much of it is due to supply constraints
(inadequate awareness, poor implementation, and other
structural bottlenecks like ineffective decentralisation) is
often difficult to ascertain. As also seen in the Round Table
Discussion on the NREGA that follows, while social activists
point to the several supply constraints, government officials
point out to the lack of demand. The 62nd round of the
NSSO (Government of India, 2006) is able to shed some light
on this by providing some figures about participation in
public works by household members of the age 15 years and
above6 for the year 2005e2006, the year prior to the
implementation of the NREGA (Exhibit 4).
We created a five-point scale from 1 to 5 based on the
demand for public worksd5 for very high demand, and 1 for
very low demand (column 4 of Exhibit 4)dand tabulated
the results (Exhibit 5).
Exhibit 5 indicates that the demand for employment
under public works does not always dovetail with the
extent of poverty in the states. Many of the poorer states
like Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Orissa (along with rich states
like Punjab and Haryana) have low demand for public work
employment. Part of the reason for this could be the poor
performance of these schemes in the past several years.
The NREGA too will have to face this ‘legacy’ effect, and it
is in such states that the efforts towards increasing the
awareness of the NREGA and its difference from other
public sector schemes need to be maximum. It is in these
states that the NREGA will have to make a visible dent in
providing a viable substitute to migration and casual
employment, which is high due to the poor experience with
public sector employment in the past.6 This was collected for the first time in this survey, and for the
purpose of this survey, public work was defined as those activities
sponsored by the government and local bodiesdschemes through
which the government generated wage employment under poverty
alleviation programmes or relief measures.A similar five-point scale based on the implementation
machinery of the statesd5 indicating very poor imple-
mentation and 1 indicating very good implementationdwas
created (Exhibit 6). This was based on our calculations of
the proportion of those who sought and did not get the work
(column 3 of Exhibit 4) out of the total who sought work.
This provides an idea of the supply side bottlenecks in the
states during the implementation of the public works
programme.
There does not emerge any cogent pattern as to the
reasons for the poor implementation of public sector
schemes in the states, with both rich and poor states at the
extremes of the spectrum. In the two years of the imple-
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Faculty and doctoral students from IIMB and other
officials of the Rural Development and Panchayat
Raj Department, Government of Karnataka, formed
part of the invited audience, and participated in
National rural employment guarantee act 47that Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh (AP) are the better
performing states in terms of job-days provided to people.
Rajasthan’s performance is predicted by the data above,
where there was a high demand for public works and good
implementation. Andhra Pradesh did not have a very high
demand for employment under public works, and its
implementation has been moderate, which implies that AP
has been able to successfully get over the ‘legacy’ effect of
public works implementation, and kick-start the working of
the NREGA.
Conclusion
The aim of this note has been to analyse the design and
implementation of the NREGA as an effective safety net in
rural India. While the NREGA explicitly recognises the right
to work, the programme design and delivery of the Act have
to effectively guarantee a job. For this, the necessary
condition is that the Act be aligned with the ground reali-
ties of employment and unemployment in rural India. We
analysed the data provided by the 62nd round of the NSSO
on rural employment and unemployment levels for the year
2006e2007. This analysis gave us important pointers on
a more effective working of the NREGA. Specifically, the
NREGA has to be closely aligned with agriculture and the
seasonality of agriculture; it has to ensure the participation
of the vast underemployed in this sector, and provide
a viable alternative to distress employment, often at
subsistence wages. It has to meet the needs of the landless,
the small and marginal farmer in dry land areas, and the
female workerdmost of whom would be illiterate. This
calls for effective decentralisation, and participation of the
village communities in planning and implementation. There
has to be increased mobilisation and awareness of the
NREGA, in order to break away from the ‘legacy’ effect of
previous poorly implemented public work schemes. The
NREGA is one of the most powerful initiatives undertaken
and if implemented in a sound manner, it has the power to
unleash the potential of rural livelihoods in India.National Rural Employment Guarantee Act:
DiscussionMacroeconomic significance of the NREGA:
Rajalaxmi Kamath
The big question about whether we need the National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) is no longer being
debated. The poor in the country need a safety net which
the NREGA is seen to provide. The Act per se, it is agreed, is
a very elegant piece of theory. However, in implementing
it, we will have to contend with the harsh political realities,
and the entrenched interest groups and lobbies.
In the absence of one of the invited panellists, Dr Mihir
Shah (Co-Founder and Secretary of Samaj Pragati
Sahayogdan NGO committed to alternative devel-
opmentdand member of the National Executive of the
Ministry of Rural Development), I will go through his
presentation, ‘Macroeconomic Significance of the NREGA:
Big Push Investment in Sustainable Livelihoods and Gover-
nance Reform’, which he has kindly sent us.
The 1990s was the worst decade in Indian agriculture
since the Green Revolution. However, for the first time
since then, the rate of growth of food grain production has
fallen below the rate of growth of population. Irrigated
agriculture has hit a plateau, and dry lands have suffered
enormous neglect. (We had a Green Revolution for the
irrigated areas but not for dry land.) Public investment in
agriculture has fallen, and recovery has been muted in the
first decade of the 21st century. An associated point here is
that in agriculture, public and private investment are
complementary, and public investment in agriculture pulls
in private investment. The recession is forcing a new
challenge and opportunity, which we must be open to.
The urban telos needs rejection. The whole perspective
of planning has been through urbanisation and
the discussion.
Exhibit 7 Charter of NREGA reforms.
 Develop anti-handouts, sustainable livelihoods
perspective
 Strengthen rural governance and panchayat raj;
dismantle contractor raj
 Provide greater professional support to gram pan-
chayats (GPs); facilitate them to recruit from open
market
 Build capacity at village level; create a cadre of
professionals for the NREGA
 Facilitate convergence with other programmes and
small farm agriculture
 Focus on national initiative to reform schedule of rates
(SoRs)
 Greater use of information technology (IT) as shown by
Andhra Pradesh (AP)
 Facilitate civil society-state partnerships for social
audit as in AP, and as implemented in Madhya Pradesh,
Chhattisgarh
 Mandatory civil society role
Exhibit 8 Unemployment rate per 1000 labour force.
Sector Usual status Current weekly status
1999e2000 2004e2005
48 R. Kamathindustrialisation, and the rural area is seen as an area to
give handouts and sops to. This process of planning, and
this view of development in India needs major rethinking7.
The NREGA is the most ambitious employment pro-
gramme in human history. Its significance goes beyond
human rights, social security, and employment. It is of the
greatest consequence for sustainable rural livelihoods,
the growth of the Indian economy, the regeneration of the
environment, and in kick starting the reform of the public
sector in rural development. The NREGA is a multiplier
based demand stimulus in this time of recession. To
explain, ‘multiplier’ is the Keynesian concept where the
money put in the hands of the people results in greater
output through each consecutive round of spending. The
rural population has a higher propensity to consume, so the
effect of the multiplier is greater. This, combined with
public investment through the NREGA, would stimulate
private investment through the accelerator. The ‘acceler-
ator’ is another Keynesian concept where a spiralling
output also ends up resulting in higher rates of private
investment. Since millions of rural labour households
covered by the NREGA own land, if one were to look at
a well functioning NREGA, these landsdeven if small and
marginaldmay become productive due to the watershed
programme, or the cleaning up of bunds, tanks etc. This
typical multiplier-accelerator interplay would affect the
impact of the NREGA. Such synergy would lead to a spiral of
growth that is sustainable in economic and ecological
terms.
Exhibit 7 lists the charter of NREGA reforms proposed by
Mihir Shah. In particular, the schedule of rates (SoRs) has
come in for much discussion, and many reforms are needed
there. The SoRs will have to take into account varying
topographies, soil conditions, human capacities, particu-
larly male and female capacities, and so on.
To add to Dr Shah’s presentation, it would be timely to
remember that the NREGA was not meant to be a fiscal
stimulus package but a safety net for the poor. When you
look at the NREGA as a stimulus package, it gets linked with
the growth rate of the economy. In India, on the other
hand, we need the NREGA even when the economy is having
that miraculous 8.5e9% growth rate. So looking at the
NREGA merely as a fiscal stimulus package would be too
narrow a view.
Employment trends in the rural areas:
S Madheswaran
The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 2005 was
brought into force by the government in February 2006. The
Act is far reaching in intent and scope, and it is the first
nation wide employment scheme that guarantees employ-
ment legally to India’s rural population. Under this pro-
gramme 3.04 crore rural households have been provided
employment so far (based on 2009 figures). A major share
goes to the disadvantaged groupsd51.04% of employment
to the scheduled castes and tribes, and 51.29% to women.
(Source: www.nrega.nic.in)7 See ‘UPA’s Challenge’, The Hindu, May 28, 2009.Given the present situation, the NREGA faces two chal-
lenges. The first is addressing the unemployment crisis in
rural areas, and the second, contributing to the village
economy in a sustained manner. India needs 1000 lakh (100
million) jobs by 2012, mostly in rural areas. But the National
Sample Survey Organisation’s (NSSO) 61st round of
employment and unemployment data indicates a reduced
unemployment rate in rural India. The detailed figures are
given in Exhibit 8.
The increasing number of self-employed people has
been pulling down the overall unemployment rate in the
last five years. For the economy, this should have been
good, but it is actually a pointer to a crisis. Analysis
suggests that this is more to do with a lack of regular job
availability than with economic wellbeing. Employment
scarcity is pushing the rural people to petty self-
employment with low and uncertain income.
An analysis of the rich cross sectional NSSO data for the
period 1999e2000 and 2004e2005 shows that while there
was growth in employment in rural areas, the aggregate
employment growth both in urban and rural India was still
slightly below the rates recorded in the period 1987e1988
and 1993e1994, when it was 2%. Employment grew sharply
in the rural areas from around 0.6% in 1994e2000 to around
1.9% during 2000e2005. In terms of absolute numbers, the
data points out a worse scenario than in 1972e1973. For
every 1000 people, only 399 people were employed in
2004e2005 compared to 404 people in 1972e1973. In 1999eRural 20 12 44 30
Urban 40 35 52 49
Source: NSSO 55th and 61st report no 515, 2004e2005
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Overall employment growth accelerated to 2.8% in 1999e
2005. However, the average unemployment rate, which had
increased from 6.1% in 1993e1994 to 7.3% in 1999e2000,
increased further to 8.3% in 2004e2005. Currently, this rate
is around 9%. It indicates that many people are not getting
regular employment, and India has not been able to meet
the employment demand despite overall employment
growth.
Added to this is the increasing demand supply scenario,
with an increasing number of people seeking jobs due to an
increase in the working age population. The rural areas
account for 74% of India’s unemployed population, and
close to 80% of the employment in these areas comes from
the agriculture sector. According to the Planning Commis-
sion estimate of 2008, based on the 61st NSSO round and
the economic census of 20058, agricultural employment has
increased at less than 1% per annum during the period
2002e2005. This also points to the unprecedented rise in
the agricultural labour work force that accounts for a major
chunk of India’s chronic poor scattered in the many back-
ward districts. It has increased from 9.5% in 1993e1994 to
15.3% in 2004e2005. At the national level, the number of
rural people employed in agriculture has come down from
762 (per 1000) in 1999e2000 to 586 in 2004e2005. So the
share of agriculture employment has come down to 74.9%
from 78.4% in 1999e2000. Though there has been a slight
recovery in the annual rate of growth from 0.3% to 0.83%,
this is not enough to sustain the demand and the situation
has not been mitigated by a proportionate increase in non
agricultural employment.
A large section of people is displaced from agriculture,
and many of these people are not even seeking daily wage
employment. Where are they? How are they employed?
According to the NSSO survey, these people are now self-
employed. There is a significant increase in self-
employment. The increase has been sharpest among rural
women where self-employment now accounts for nearly
two-thirds of all jobs. Overall, around half of the workforce
in India currently does not work for a direct employer in
both agriculture and non agriculture. On the face of it, the
trend of people moving from paid jobs to independent jobs
is a welcome one. However, if people are moving because
they are not getting regular paid jobs, it is a distress signal
in the employment scenario. According to a recent Macro-
Scan analysis by C P Chandrasekhar and Jayati Ghosh
(2008), with the significant increase in self-employment,
employment in agriculture has actually fallen quite sharply.
This is especially the case for the less educated worker with
limited access to bank credit or capital. The Planning
Commission Report of 2008 assesses that the 4.7% growth in
non agriculture employment was entirely in the unorgan-
ised sector, mainly in low productive self-employment. The
characteristics of the workforce in India indicate that this
change is distress driven, led by the inability to find gainful
paid employment, and the apparent increase in employ-
ment figures may be more an outcome of a survival strategy
than a demand led spike. There has been a failure in8 Employment Perspective and Labour Policy, 11th Five Year Plan
document, Planning Commission, 2008.understanding the real nature of unemployment in the
country. Correspondingly, the number of rural landless
households is growing. Further, ecological assets like land
and forest are the key employment sources for the rural
people of India. Any attempt to create employment should
focus on these sectors. A quantitative approach to
employment leads to low quality, which in turn leads to low
standards of employment. So while employment may be
generated, the jobs become unproductive very soon,
leaving people unemployed once again, or grossly under-
employed. To second what Professor Rajalaxmi said, the
NREGA scheme should not be seen only as a wage-earning
scheme but also as a livelihood programme.
NREGA: the gap between promise and
performance: Aruna Roy
The NREGA is the first legal entitlement for the poor in this
country towards realising the right to work, and hence,
a right to livelihood. For people who have been at the
receiving end of an unequal economic structure since
Independence, this is the first real economic right to an
economic entitlement with dignity.
Implications of the NREGA
The Act gives rural people the right to apply for and
demand work. For the first time, this presages a real shift in
power for the poor peasant who can now demand work if s/
he needs it, without having to be selected as a Below
Poverty Line (BPL) family, or waiting for the government to
initiate a particular programme, or for a formal assessment
of the situation by the authorities, or for the block/village
to be declared drought stricken.
Again, for the first time in the history of the relationship
between the people and those who govern us, people are
entitled to compensationdan unemployment allowance if
work is not provided within 15 days.
The Act mandates various measures for transparency in
functioning. The Act owes its transparency provisions to the
right to information campaign that preceded it. In the
debates that preceded the passing of the Act in 2005, the
campaign for the enactment of the NREGA argued on the
basis of the experience of the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti San-
gathan (MKSS) in Rajasthan, that bringing in the trans-
parency and proactive disclosure provisions from the Right
to Information (RTI) Act would benefit the NREGA. It is the
first act in the world that has mandated regular statutory
social audits. A lot depends upon how far we are able to
work on these ideas and implement them.
The Act gives people the right to choose work. This leads
us to ask several questions. Have the required capacities
been built? Are there structures in place for people to
choose their work? What will be the role of the gram sabha?
The Act assures us that people have a right to know how
much they are working, how much they will be paid, and
what the schedule of rates is. This has forced governments,
perhaps for the first time since independence, to commis-
sion time and motion studies to scientifically examine the
nature of work, time, and payment, and to assess how
much work a person can do. Under the provisions of the
Act, people need not go more than 5 km away from where
they live to work, and are assured of being paid their wages
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ment public works was that payments were made very late;
so late that workers when faced with a choice between
working in a public works programme and working outside,
chose to work outside not because it was superior work-
dthey usually had to work much harder, and on more
difficult termsdbut because they were paid every day, or
knew exactly how much money they would get. The Act
assures working women of facilities such as a cre`che,
drinking water, information boards, and minimum medical
facilities.
The Act promises a proper grievance redressal mecha-
nism. This has built up accountability within the govern-
ment which has already had an impact in Rajasthan, Andhra
Pradesh, and other government and public works systems,
where there is a demand now for transparency and
accountability. The Act has enabled enforcement of law
from outside, initiated by citizens and citizens groups, and
not by mechanisms within the government alone.
Most importantly, the NREGA has set up systems to
enforce accountability, through the mandatory processes of
transparency as well as the process of public audit, i.e.
social audit. This is the first time that citizen based public
accountability is mandated in any programme of the
government.
NREGA: the bottlenecks
However, there are problems with the NREGA and the
associated processes as well.
Applying for work in India has been a process fraught
with problems. Works are opened by the government at
their convenience, rather than at the demand of people.
People apply, but applications are not received, even in
a state like Rajasthan which has a track record in public
opinion building and people’s movements. Receipts are not
given for applications received. Further, work is not given
in the assured 15 days’ time. It has become impossible to
get unemployment allowance without a big struggle.
Information is accessible, and transparency provisions
are followed in grades and degrees. When there are millions
of rupees going into contracts, asking for information may
have life-threatening consequences. There have been
instances of activists being murdered just for asking for
information about rural employment guarantee. So it is not
a trivial issue and its gravity must be understood.
While it is well intentioned, the government system is still
not geared to allow people to choose their work. Even where
people have chosen the work, the scheme has not been
implemented as was planned. Often, the system of giving
contracts to draw up work and perspective plans to NGOs and
not the gram sabhas has been detrimental because the NGOs,
unlike government bodies, lack accountability. The gram
sabhas are better placed to assess what people need; NGOs
can function in an advisory capacity.
Wages have not come in time to post offices and banks,
even in states with sympathetic governments, and when
they have, the banks and post offices have been unable to
handle payments because of the large numbers. Despite
inordinate delays, no compensation is being paid as per the
provisions of the Act.
There is no facility for social audit. Except perhaps in
a state like Andhra Pradesh which has understood itsresponsibility in reducing corruption, as well as guaran-
teeing that the workers get the employment that they are
entitled to. Since it is government money being spent,
social audit is the responsibility of the government. The
government can engage other organisations such as NGOs to
help, but the responsibility lies with the government. This
is another very crucial area because social audit, which in
effect questions money flows, could upset the vested
interests from the village up to the state level. In Rajas-
than, in the year 2000, the government passed the social
audit ordinance and then made it a law, but nevertheless,
even in Rajasthan, the moment we go into social audit
there are many problems, including the sharp reactions to
it from the ruling class.
Proper management of works is very important. There
has to be a worksite manager, without whom the entire
system collapses. The Suchna Rozgar (SR) Abhiyan and the
MKSS as a part of the campaign are involved in the training
of such managers, by upgrading and training the tradi-
tional ‘mates’. This is a real challenge, even for Rajas-
than, which, being a drought-prone state, has pre-NREGA
systems to deal with large scale employment and
management of public works during famine and drought.
There have been instances in our areas of work where
women workers have preferred having an unsatisfactory
‘mate’ to not having one at all, because without a work-
site manager it becomes very difficult to assess, measure,
and apportion the work.
There must be an effective grievance redressal system
which should be routed through the Programme Officer at
the panchayat samiti or Block level. As provided in Section
25 of the NREGA Act, a punishment mechanism for not
following the grievance redressal system should also be in
place, to act as a deterrent. Accountability is very impor-
tant if transparency has to become a reality. Here, state
governments must exhibit determination, like the govern-
ment in Andhra Pradesh, where social audits are conducted
regularly and successfully, where people have been made
accountable, and money that was defalcated has been
returned in public meetingsda gesture that has been seen
as an attempt by political parties to become more honest.
Further, 6% of the NREGA budget has been allotted for
administrative costs in every state. But the states are
reluctant to spend it for that purpose. We worked out that
if you spend just 1% on transparency and social audit
mechanismsdincluding the setting up of a social audit cell,
and training peopledthen you will be successful in plugging
many of the loopholes and controlling corruption in the
state. Unless the budget and expenditure details of the 6%
become transparent, we cannot know where the money is
being spent and demand changes in allocation and priority
for other provisions under the Act. Just as we fight for
political commitment to the NREGA, we must fight for
a political will to conduct social audit, and to face the
political and administrative consequences.
Implementation challenges of the NREGA: P Ravi
Kumar
Gram panchayats (GPs) are the key agencies in the scheme
of the NREGA. Their responsibilities include registration
and issuing of job cards, receiving demand for work and
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supervision, payment of wages, and opening of accounts.
However, GPs lack the capacity to perform the tasks
assigned to them. Even in Karnataka, with 20 years of
devolution and capacity building, this continues to remain
a challenge. GPs are reluctant to take applications for the
NREGA schemes, and applications are often not received
because of the fear of the unemployment allowance which
has to be disbursed if work cannot be provided. GPs are not
strengthened commensurate with their responsibilities. In
many states, GPs are responsible for various other schemes
such as maintenance of water supply, housing, etc, where
the money flow is greater than in the NREGA schemes. The
NREGA has also brought hitherto unknown tasks such as
data entry and record keeping to the GPs, which has
increased their paper work. GPs have to register the jobs,
keep a record of all the job cards issued, and maintain
nominal muster rolls (NMRs), an account of weekly
payments, and so on. The NREGA mandates transparency,
but concepts such as transparency and people demanding
their rights are new to GPs, and this has created issues of
implementation.
The NREGA has to be demand driven. The officers
responsible are now driving the demanddgetting people,
starting the work, taking in applications, and getting the
paper work done. There has been a failure to capture
demand. In addition, the scheme seems more target driven.
This flows from a lack of dissemination of information.
Elected representatives and the bureaucracy must play an
active role in the scheme, particularly in the information/
education campaign. So far, it is mostly driven by NGOs.
There are long delays in wage payment. In other agricul-
tural work, labourers get an advance. So a labourer would
rather take 40 rupees in advance than wait for 80 rupees
that will be paid after two months. Banks are also not able
to cope with the huge workload. There is a shortage of staff
at all levels and an inadequate delegation of powers.
Corruption persists.
The NREGA is not envisaged as an asset creation pro-
gramme. The gram sabhas do not prioritise NREGA schemes.
While the law says that you should provide work, it does not
specify the type of work. So there often is an improper
selection of works. For example, de-silting, which is
a water conservation work, is often not suited to the
capacity of women labourers. Further, maintenance of
assets is not given due consideration. Labourers often do
not come continuously, and are on the lookout for alter-
native work. This results in incomplete works. Many will not
work for eight hours. Men usually go for agriculture and the
women come to the NREGA schemes leading to problems
about type, quality, and selection of works. This issue has
to be addressed. The scope of work should widen from the
present land based and manual work to include skilled
work. Further, as Aruna Roy has already detailed, there is
no grievance redressal mechanism.
The future of the NREGA depends on several critical issues
and actions, which include strengthening the work applica-
tion processdan independent agency for receiving applica-
tions for work and grievance redressal is essentialdand
implementing transparency safeguards, working out a wage
policy, ensuring the participation of women, ensuring timely
wage payment and an effective grievance redressal system,incentivising the bureaucracy to take up NREGA schemes,
strengthening GPs/implementing agencies, using technology
effectively in the system, and ensuring that the people own
the NREGA scheme and drive it.NREGA: some practical solutions to administrative
problems: Trilochan Sastry
The previous speakers have covered most of the ground on
the NREGA, so I will just emphasise a few points. There are
a few practical problems with the administrative machinery,
which need to be addressed. A large number of positions are
vacant, starting from that of the village secretary. It is
imperative that we fill up administrative positions.
The budget for administrative expenses, which is 6%
(over and above the salaries) is not being utilised. If utilised
effectively, it can play a role in capacity building and
training. Here, it is necessary for NGOs and activists to help
the government to undertake some of the training pro-
grammes for the administrative machinery right down to
the basics.
In some districts, there were interruptions in the smooth
flow of money and delays in payment despite efforts at
streamlining. As mentioned by the previous speakers and as
surveys show, the lack of response to applications, the lack
of timely payments, not paying at all or not paying the
proper amount, etc can discourage the entire village. This
impacts implementation. And then it develops into a vicious
circle. So financial flows and the administrative system to
ensure that money moves quickly and smoothly are
imperative.
Permit me to disagree with the house on one or two
issues. We keep saying that GPs do not have capacity, and
are not capable of performing. But if we engage with them
a bit more closely, we will see that they do have some
capacities. The NREGA can be particularly effective in
drought prone areas. Unfortunately there is a history of
people being suspicious of the NREGA; that is a baggage
that we carry. We cannot deny that there is a point of
conflict between the farmers and the labour. The wage
rates are definitely going up, and farmers are unhappy
about it as it is going to impact agriculture. They are more
powerful than labour, and they often use their local polit-
ical clout to stifle the NREGA. In dry land areas where there
is maximum distress, if we can converge with other
schemes, and if we can focus on reviving water bodies,
their opposition to the NREGA would melt. This has been
our experience. Because if you can bring water into the
villages it helps farming, and they can get two crops instead
of one crop. And in an ideal situation their income would go
up two to three times. It also provides employment. At the
risk of oversimplification, I would strongly urge that we
focus on the single point agenda of reviving the water
bodies in the dry land areas to help farmers and labourers.
Enough has been said by the earlier speakers on social
audit, and so I don’t want to go over the same ground. One
point perhaps which has not been made is that, much like the
trade unions in the industries which have formal legal
recognition in that they are registered entities with a legal
entitlement to negotiate with the management on various
issues, the NREGA too needs a similar provision. Associations
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and empowered to negotiate with the government and
demand their own rights. We cannot leave it to civil society
watch dogs, NGOs, and the goodwill of the government,
although they all have a role to play.
Discussion
Aruna Roy: I want to address the question of assets that Mr
Ravi Kumar has raised. Assets will never be created unless we
allow people to decide for themselves. People living in the
village, even the most illiterate of women, know best what is
required to make the village better. And the NREGA is the
system that creates assets. However, I agree that you cannot
uniformly have the same kind of assets everywhere and for
everyone. There are three critical issues that I want to table.
One is old age. Men and women over 60 cannot work on the
NREGA. Our slogan is ‘poora kam, poora daam’ or full
payment for full work, which is essential for the creation of
assets. So what is the NREGA going to do for people in the age
group, even say above 55? This is something we have to
address because we have no age bar in the NREGA.
Second, how are we going to use the various inputs that
we have? For instance, we have a very large group of
extraordinary singers in Rajasthan called the Langas and
the Manganias, who perform in prestigious events all over
the country, and across the world. But they come back
home, and they are abjectly poor, and live in abysmally
difficult conditions. Why should the Langa and the Mangania
dig earth? Why can’t they teach singing in the village, in the
government schools? This is just one example to show that
we must diversify work under the NREGA. There was
another point raised about paper work. There are many
young people who are unemployed, and who do not want to
work in the present NREGA schemes. Many of them can
work on computers. The NREGA must create work for such
people as well.
Speaking of paper work and keeping records, let me give
you an example of how the NREGA records can be kept up
to date. In Vijaypura panchayat, Rajsamand district,
Rajasthan, the wall of the panchayat is used as a web wall,
and is part of the Management Information System (MIS).
The basic information about the works commissioned, the
expenditure on labour and material, the money sanctioned,
the job card numbers (all residents of the village are enti-
tled to a job card through which they apply for work), the
name of the family, and other details are painted on the
walls of the school buildings, cre`ches, and panchayat
office. Frauds have been detected through this system
when differences were spotted between the job card, the
muster roll, and the payment register. If you have these
web walls bearing all the necessary information, you have
to paint them once in five years and update the information
where you just add an additional column to the table that is
already there. This is a proactive measure of transparency,
which is very crucial. People in this country will speak up
but they have to be informed to speak. Suo moto disclosure
under the Right to Information Act, Section 4 which is
mandatory under the NREGA, provokes people into coming
out with numbers and information. Further, the NREGA
Website has details right up to the name of each worker,
how many days s/he has worked, and how much s/he hasbeen paid. And for this country, it is a phenomenal
achievement. So this Webpage is very important.
The last point I want to make is more in the nature of an
appeal. We still have to put a system in place; no state has
succeeded fully in doing that, so it is important that
wedpolicy makers, the government, activists, and other
stakeholdersddo not stand divided. This one programme has
forced us to think collectively. We all have to work together
with the government and make the government deliver. We
all see different aspects of the problem, and these are
partial truths. Unless all the stakeholders get together, move
beyond generalities, and discuss each mechanism of the
NREGA in detail, we will really not begin to even understand
the magnitude of the challenges. For instance, a group of us
comprising three principal secretaries to the government,
five activists, and many others spent seven days looking at
grievance redressal, and we still could not arrive at conclu-
sions which could apply uniformly to the whole of India. So
we must address the challenges with humility, because to
address something of this magnitude pertaining to the whole
of India really requires diverse kinds of skills and intelli-
gences put together, a task force so to say, to address the
challenges with sympathy for the poor.
Rajalaxmi Kamath: When it comes to the implementa-
tion of the NREGA and if you all were to reach a consensus
on the one implementation issue that could be solved
easily, what would it be?
P Ravi Kumar: The receipt of applications for work.
Though there is demand and people want work, applications
are not received systematically and acknowledged. That
discourages people from applying, and we say there is no
demand, and it becomes a problem of hidden employment. If
that is done properly, all other things will fall in place. The
task of receiving applications cannot be left to the gram
panchayat secretary alone. So we are thinking of some body
or organisation outside the government to receive applica-
tions, such as telecentres in the villages, or the Gram Rozgar
Sahayak, who will be funded out of the NREGA, and incen-
tivised to collect applications, and maintain records prop-
erly. We are trying to see if there can be a Web-based
application system where applications can be filed for
a small fee.
Aruna Roy: The receipt of applications has engaged our
attention for a long time now, because it has been such an
impossible task to get the gram panchayat to take appli-
cations. The Web-based approach may work in villages that
have connectivity, but even in fairly progressive states,
villages are not assured of electricity for considerable
stretches of time. One alternative would be post cards
addressed to responsible officers with an acknowledgement
built in, which can be worked through a system. The best
solution lies in directing the applications to another
government official who is not directly in line with the
employment to be given at the village level. We have been
arguing in Rajasthan and in the Central Council for
a teacher, or an Anganwadi worker, or even a veterinary
assistant or an auxiliary nurse midwife to take applica-
tionsdanyone outside the panchayat system in that village.
Their job will be just to take the application, hand out
a receipt, and hand over the applications to the panchayat.
We will also have to think a priori of transparency. People
must be made aware that they can and must apply, and
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space in Doordarshan, Akashvani, and other public forums.
Audience: The postal system can be inducted into this
scheme. Payment can be made through rural post offices,
and this agency can be incentivised to accept applications.
A centralised Web-based citizen facilitation centre, or
a help line, or a call centre is also feasible. Such a system
would enable monitoring the processes. Unless we have
a system where demand registration is completely inde-
pendent of the implementation machinery, the problem
cannot be solved satisfactorily.
The National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) is another
programme where akshaykartas take the applications and
get them submitted at the block or taluk level. They are
paid by the number of cases they take to the primary health
centres for delivery. The NREGA too could work out such
a system.
Aruna Roy: It is difficult to think of a blanket prescrip-
tion, but it should be an independent mechanism, and it
should be separate from the control of the gram panchayat.
We will have to build a mechanism within the system where
responsibility is fixed, and the state government, or the
authorities at the district level, or the equivalent of the
panchayat samiti will have to own responsibility. However,
there are issues associated with this that must be thought
through. Though you can think of linking the incentive to
the application, you cannot tie up a person’s basic salary
with the responsibility for accepting applications. Further,
you cannot put the entire responsibility on one individual in
a system which fails to deliver. Because the individual is
only part of a larger system. We will have to address that
issue as well.
We must take account of the fact that the gram pan-
chayat is an elected body, and it is accountable to the gram
sabha (which is the forum of all adult electors or people
registered on the electoral rolls of the village panchayat).
Despite the various conflicts of power it is in our interest to
see that the gram sabha functions because it is the only
system we have of public representation at the village
level. Given the legacy of poor public accountability that
we have in our country, we have to perform a part educa-
tive, part empowering, and part accountable role, and
ensure such a process. And in a country of this size, unless
the government starts the educative process, there will be
no education. One of the principal reasons why the NREGA
has not taken root is while many pockets in India wanted the
NREGA, the larger run of people did not understand its
benefits. But today I am at my most optimistic. For one
thing, all young people today realise that without delivery,
they cannot get voted. In the complex new scenario, the GP
is the nub. It is the centre of our activities through which we
will have to approach the people on a large scale and talk
about the NREGA. Where applications have been refused,
the consequences of such an act must also become clear,
and for that, people must be informed. At the same time,
with the sum of one crore (10 million) rupees coming to the
panchayat there will be a shift of power. The new kind of
Sarpanch or Panchayat President will have to be account-
able. And we will have to work very hard there.
Audience: The NREGA has become a big component of
spending at the panchayat level. Is it at the cost of other
schemes? Is it overwhelming the panchayats, particularlytheir day to day functioning? Further, is it too early to
increase the scope of works that come under the NREGA?
There is a lot of work to be done in India for water and
sanitation security especially for women. Is it time to
increase the scope of the NREGA in those directions?
Aruna Roy: When we speak of the ‘over burdened’
panchayat, we must remember that under the NREGA for
the first time there has been a devolution of funds to
a panchayat to conduct work. And all the works do not
necessarily have to go through the panchayat. They can
also go through the line departments. But the line depart-
ments have to work with the panchayat (and will come in
for scrutiny) because labour comes through the panchayat.
So we are not burdening the panchayat in that sense. The
panchayat is only in focus because we need to empower it.
What we now to have to do, which is what is being done in
Andhra Pradesh, is to spread the social audit process. All
rural activities or smaller kasba activities will have to come
under scrutiny, into the purview of social accountability.
Audience: Is it possible that the elected representatives
are not interested in these schemes as it is difficult to
siphon off money from the NREGA schemes? Further, the
NREGA has laid down specific areas that will be covered.
Local representatives have pointed out that beyond the
eight categories that have been specified, they want the
freedom to choose their work area.
P Ravi Kumar: To prevent misappropriation of funds, we
have started a direct electronic transfer of funds to pan-
chayats based on their demand, on an experimental basis.
In fact, we are now planning a system, with the help of
software, where the panchayats do not even have to ask for
money. We will know the money available with each gram
panchayat as of the first of the month. A pop up on the
computer will inform us about the gram panchayats that
are going below the prescribed level, and we will send the
required amount through the Real Time Gross Settlement
(RTGS) system on the same day.
Aruna Roy: The creation of genuine assets continues to
remain a real challenge to the policy makers in our country.
If the NREGA is to be effective, it has to change the nature
of politics. Programmes like the NREGA will have to be used
to improve the delivery system. If delivery improves in the
NREGA, it will improve in the other areas as well. I will
reemphasise that if we do not fix accountability, and do not
punish a few defrauders as a means of deterrence, the
NREGA will not work. The NREGA is an important means of
getting back the faith in the system of governance and
accountability in this country.
Audience: In the long run, the NREGA should be apolit-
ical. Is there a significant risk that schemes like the NREGA
will be used as a political tool? What can be done to address
this?
Aruna Roy: In the last elections, some parties claimed
credit for the NREGA but still lost the elections. People
have generally concluded that the real issues must be
addressed. While parties or candidates may draw attention
to community and religious affiliations, above and beyond
that, you will have to deliver and people will vote on the
basis of rationality and common sense.
Audience: The final frontier in terms of delivery seems
to be how to deliver better to the people. How do we get
more participation from them? How does the bureaucracy
54 R. Kamathinteract with people better? What have been our experi-
ences with different delivery mechanisms which use the
government, NGOs, or partnerships?
Audience: To raise a related point, even though this is
a good scheme at the conceptual level, different states
have performed differently. We have to see how much of it
is due to governance, and how much of it comes from the
demand side. What are the determinants of the differential
performance of the NREGA?
Aruna Roy: Governance is not a job. It is an obligation to
serve your country, and to perform the functions which you
are allotted. The Constitution of India says that we are
a sovereign people giving unto ourselves the Constitution,
and the people we appoint are our representatives doing
work. That consciousness has come with the NREGA and
with the RTI, which have reinforced the responsibility
aspect of governance rather than the right. The civil service
is to be assisted, kept in control, made accountable, and
applauded. Governance is actually our collective business.
We all have certain roles to play. The NREGA has made us
aware of that.
For instance, today, technological institutes and people
in the business of industrial design are looking at tools
seriously perhaps for the first time since Independence.
One of the side effects of the NREGA is that it has impacted
management information systems (MIS). The NREGA Web-
site is probably one of the best Websites the government
has. You have to work with your politicians to make sure
that they understand the benefits that they derive from the
NREGA, and use different institutions existing in this
country (including the Accountant General’s office) for
pushing this employment programme, and improving and
creating assets. It cannot be done by any single institution.
That is quite clear.
Trilochan Sastry: Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka are
otherwise very similar but the NREGA functioning is quite
different. In the last 10e15 years, in Andhra Pradesh,
millions of women have been organised into self-help
groups. A large-scale mobilisation took place. This raised
public awareness about several issues. Our survey (in Raichur
and Gulbarga in Karnataka, and Ananthapur and Adilabad in
Andhra) revealed awareness levels in excess of 90% in Andhra
Pradesh on the NREGA, right down to the details of rights and
entitlements, while in Karnataka it was 20e30% less. In
Karnataka, we must find our own innovative ways of building
awareness.
P Ravi Kumar: What is the effect of NREGA on farmers,
agricultural labour and agricultural productivity? Has there
been any study?
S Madheswaran: While there has been an evaluation by
the ministry on job creation, the number of assets created,
and the preferred works particularly under the farmer cate-
gory, the real effectiveness of the NREGA scheme has not
been evaluated through field level studies, particularly on
farmers’ households. There are three things to keep in mind
here while conducting an assessmentdincreasing the
average annual income of the household, increasing produc-
tivity of small and marginal house holdings, and assessing the
contribution of other assets such as water tanks, etc.
It is also important to assess the trends over a period of
time, the growth of employment and unemployment, and
so on.Audience: The lack of a stable government and the lack
of continuity of office bearers hinders the success of the
NREGA whose success depends much upon the extent of
political and administrative devolution.
Aruna Roy: While we do need a stable government, irre-
spective of the lack of continuity of the officers, we must
make the programme deliver. There must be a dialogue also
between civil society, NGOs, people’s movements, activists,
and the government to make representatives deliver. So I
think that force has to be built up. Then no matter what kind
of officer comes, he will have to deliver. We have to work to
build that kind of pressure on the government to work.
S Madheswaran: (To Aruna Roy) Do you see a role for the
conditional transfer programme here? Is it feasible for India
or not? Many South American countries like Brazil are using
it. Secondly, asset creation is the motive of the NREGA.
Most of the literature says that it does not do enough to
address the institutional and management gaps that exist in
the programmes of soil, water, and forest conservation.
What is your opinion on this?
Aruna Roy: Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) is now being
sold as an alternative to the NREGA. It is being propagated
by the World Bank as having been implemented successfully
in South America, Mexico, and other countries. But CCT is
an idea and a concept of development that India had
rejected many years ago as non functioning. In India we
need an institutional mechanism which will build people
into being more self-reliant, and enable them to take part
in democracy; we don’t want them to go back to the ‘mai
baap’ attitude of CCT. We want them to work for a wage so
that they will start thinking about what will benefit them
and their village, participate in processes, and make the
gram sabha function. With CCT you are not treating your
citizens as equal citizens who must be given an opportunity
to exercise their minds, and therefore become active
participants in a democracy. Under the CCT, women are
compensated if they take their pre- and post- natal injec-
tions, or if they send their children to school. People should
send their children to school because they benefit from
that, and not because they are paid to do so. At a level of
social accountability and as a concept of strengthening
democracy it is completely unacceptable. Conceptually,
structurally, and democratically, CCT will set India back. It
will lead to increased levels of corruption. It is a depen-
dence programme, as opposed to the NREGA which is an
empowerment programme. Also built into the NREGA is the
whole system of transparency and accountability mandated
by law. The gram sabha is mandated to pass the works, and
perform a social audit, and do many more things before the
next instalment of money comes in. On the other hand, we
should think of schemes such as pensions and alternative
employment for older people, and people with disabilities
so that you will produce productive assets.
Trilochan Sastry: To address Prof Madheswaran’s second
point, aren’t we overburdening the NREGA? While it must
certainly be free from corruption and create productive
assets, can it be burdened with saving forests, replenishing
water tables, removing soil degradation, and so on, when
there are dedicated departments for those tasks? The
purpose of the NREGA is to provide employment to the
poor, and it is very clearly defined, and it is those valid
results that are to be evaluated. Further, we must also
National rural employment guarantee act 55desist from a microscopic scrutiny or an over scrutiny of the
NREGA as with any other institution.
Rajalaxmi Kamath: Thank you all for being here. This
has been a fruitful discussion where we have gone beyond
a simplistic analysis of the issues.
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